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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UNION pACIFIC
COMPANY,

RAILROAD

I

Plaintiff~.Appellant,

-vs.TRUSTEES, INC., and
JEAN C. CRANMER,
THOMAS D. BRADEN
and EDWARD G. KNOWLES,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case
No. 8762

Respondents' Brief
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The fundamental facts of this case may be simply
and briefly summarized as follows:
1. The Plaintiff-Appellant, Union Pacific Railroad
Company, was organized _.Julr__~, 18~_71 at a time when
there was no statutory provision relating to the making
of charitable contributions and under articles which made
no reference to the making of such contributions.
1
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2. The Appellant corporation was formed, as epitomized in Appellant's Brief (Appl. Br. 3), "for the purpose of operating and maintaining a railroad'' and ''the
business of the corporation is the transportation of
freight and passengers by rail and activities incident
thereto.''

r. _,.

I

3. On May 13, 1955, Appellant incorporated under
the laws of the St.ate of Utah the Union Pacific Railroad
Foundation, as a charitable foundation .

.______

4. On May 26, 1955, Appellant's Directors adopted
a resolution authorizing a contribution of $5,000.00 to
the Union Pacific Railroad Foundation, which for purposes of this proceeding, and the prevailing circumstances, may be_eonceded to be a charitable donation.
5. Defendants-Respondents challenged the authority
of Appellant's Directors to use corporate funds in the
making of such a donation, and Appellant brought this
·~ suit for a Declaratory Judgment as to said Director's
.,~ ~ower to use=&irpora te funds in the m~king of such a
~donation. T~-~ trial court upheld Respo~dents '_challenge
_,. --/ and found on all ISSues Ill favor of Respondents and
.
--ragainst Appellant.

~"'

Respondents contend that the foregoing summary of
facts constitutes all of the salient points involved in this
controversy and maintain that Appellant's so-called
"Statement of the Case'' (Appl. Br. 3-12) insofar as it
contains any material not included in the above summary
is argumentative surplusage and subject to the evidenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tiary objections of immateriality and irrelevancy. Objections to this effect were made at the time such additional
material contained in Appellant's ''Statement of the
Case" was offered in evidence (R. 51).
The issue involved in this case is whether it is within
the powers of the Appellant corporation to make the
contribution involved in this case or similar contributions, and not whether this contribution of the Appellant
corporation was intended to serve or would tend to serve
the admittedly laudable objectives of charitable giving.
Accordingly, Respondents are willing to concede that the
~!_eemo-;~~'i:y.'action taken by the Directors of the Appellant would have been worthy of commendation had they
been donating their own funds rather than the corporate
income or assets. If the owners of the corporation, its
stockholders, had agreed in their articles to permit such
contributions or did now agree by amending such articles
or ratifying such acts, there would be no dispute. But
such is not the case. Respo~~e_nJ;~,-~s some of the owners
of Appellant corporation, contest the right and authority
of Appellant's Directors to make such contributions upon
the ground that they cannot be justified on legal principles, notwithstanding the merits of charity and the national importance of education. To permit said Directors
to make such contribution and similar contributions is to
disregard the contract between the Appellant corporation
and its stockholder-owners.
Respondents contend that all of the evidence introduced by way of platitudes as to the public service aspects
3
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of giving have nothing to do with legal issues involved in
this matter, which issues relate to the purposes of Appellant corporation. Respondents further contend that all of
said evidentiary matter could more properly be presented
at a meeting g_f_theowners of-Appellan:r ·corporation to
persuade them to amend the articles of contract so as to
permiT the_ subject contribu_t~~~-!? be made Without ~he
contest on constitutional and other grounds of the right
the Directors to ~se il1~~~e- ~nd assets of the Appellant corporation for donations to good causes. Can it be
doubted that the stockholders, if so perusaded, would circumscribe their grant of authority by limitations other
than the Directors' discretion as what share of the corG''~ porate assets would constitute a '' ~s~~~hare'' "to
be given, as Appellant asserts, to preserve ''a favorable
economic and social environment''?

of

Respondents submit that to uphold the action of the
Directors in making such contribution would effectively
modify the contract between the Appellant corporation
and the shareholders which originally was formed for the
purpose of operating and maintaining a railroad, and for
the transportation of freight and passengers by rail and
activities incident thereto into a contract including the
foregoing purposes but adding thereto ''the giving away
of corporate assets.'' I:g oth~r words the contract whic!t
originally was to make a profit for the owners woulg_ be
,--::;:-- changed into a ~Q-P:~~a5}tt~ -m~ke a profit and give to-_chari~- tics such part thereof as the Directors specify. I-s it not
possible that the stockholdersas recipients of dividends
would prefer to select the objects and be praised for their

-

-~-

-~---

4
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individual acts of charity made possible by greater
dividends~

Appellant's ''Statement of the Case,'' it is submitted,
contains a basic non sequitur. Appellant reasons that:
(1) To make a charitable contribution is good, in fact,
plausibly needful for society or some elements thereof,
(2) Appellant's Directors have made a charitable contribution; therefore Appellant's Directors have authority to
make such charitable contribution. Assuming the major
premise of the syllogism and conceding the minor premise, it, nonetheless, does not follow that the action of
Appellant's Directors in the making of a charitable contribution was within the scope of their legal authority.

-~\')

((J~_; f:r->IV

--_f-t. . -.

.~

1...::

Befo!e disc~_ssing the real issues which this case pre~ .;~~~f't~
sents, and t_!t-2_~~--~~~~~~~~~.,_.}t-appears·-a-ppro-·::::_
priate to comment on certaffi matfers whiC1r may relate
to the "public interest" involved in the making of
donations in view of Appellant's emphasis upon "public
interest. ''
Appellant's witnesses asserted their faith in and
their desire to maintain our free enterprise system, a
faith and desire shared by Respondents. A basic part of ,...-,
that system is investment ~?r profit. Another basic ele- (!j_)
ment of that system is the infegrlty of contractual ::.;
.r-..._).·
r!la~~~mshi ps.

Much was said by Appellant's witnesses as to the
importance of education and public welfare in our free
enterprise system. However, in the field of education, our

5
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tax supported public institutions are the very foundation
of education. Much state and federal tax revenue goes to
other public welfare functions of government. The record in this case amply shows that one of the inducing
. factors for gifts to the Union Pacific Foundation would
be that the corporate income so given would not be subected to taxation. The major portio~ftFedonated
..._- ~ und~u]_~, _except for' donation, have become t~~- ~~v-.
/
n~~~- the use of which wOUl<I serve the public intere_s~~
Mr. John H. Watson, one of Appellant's witnesses,
stated (Appl. Br. 6 and 40) that corporate gifts now
aggregate over $500 million annually. A conservative
estimate would be that such donations result in a reduction of over a quarter of a billion dollars annually in tax
revenues from corporations. Had this corporate income
not been so dona ted and had the funds remaining after
the payment of corporate taxes been distributed to the
stockholders as dividends, there would have been still further tax revenue. Reduction in tax revenue means either
reduced funds for education, welfare or other functions
of government or new or higher taxes to replace the lost
revenue. New taxes or higher taxes mean that the burden of the gifts is in substantial part imposed upon
others, including corporation stockholders.
Appellant is a public utility whose rates are fixed by
regulation so as to produce a fair return upon its inYestment. Appellant has sought and is seeking rate increases
to that end. Appellant states (Appl. Br. 50) that the issue
of whether the contribution in question or similar eontri6
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bu~ay

be charged to operating expense with some
consequent effect upon the users of Appellant's rail service is irrelevant. Respondents concede that irrelevancy
as far as the legal issues in this case are concerned but
maintain that such circumstance along with other circumstances are not irrelevant to the portrayal which
Appellant would make as to the public interest in, and
fundamental good of, the giving away of corporate
income. If railroad rates are to be fixed to give a fair re)
turn on the investment, then does it n~ follow that the ' /
s!_()ckh~l~~r_s _()f App~llant corporati<:>I1,. ~~.<?~ 3:!-~. the_~real
investors, are entitled to that fair return upon their
investments.
Appellant states that a corporation should bear its
reasonable share of the cost of preserving a favorable
economic and social environment. The share of corporate a_ 'j
income which is paid in state and federal taxes represents"--/
in and of itself a considerable contribution toward our
national economic and social environment.
ARGUMENT
It will be the purpose of Respondents hereinafter to
parallel, insofar as feasible, the organization of the Brief
of Appellant.

I

Section 16·-2-14(8) Utah Code .Annotated
(1953) did not invest Appellant corporation with
power to make the subject contribution.

7
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a. The statutory power to donate is not applicable

to Appellant, a pre-existing corporation.
Appellant's discussion under I(a) at pages 13-21 of
its Brief involves and must necessarily involve the proposition that Section 16-2-14(8) was intended to have and
does have and could constitutionally have restrospective
--== ~
application to Appellant corporation which was formed
long prior to such 1955 enactment.
Appellant points out (Appl. Br. 13) that in addition
to Utah thirty-eight
states,
the District
of Columbia. and
_......_,_
....
.
~awaii have enacted statutes granting to corporations
power to engage in philanthropy. Appellant also points
~
o~t that in seventeen of these states the power was granted without limitation as to amount. It would thus appear
that the majority of these states passing such enact.... ..
ments have prescribed limitations and have not agreed
with the ''blank check'' recommendation of the American
Bar Association committee to which Appellant refers.
'

-

---

,

Appellant also contends (Appl. Br. 42-50) that the
Utah statutory enactment was but a legislative recognition of an inherent and implied corporate power. If such
be the case, it is strange that these many states have felt
legislation to be necessary and if such be the case, then

)~
·

it would seem
to follow
that
tlH' twenty-three instances
......... .
... --.--._.....
where the statutes pre.s~~:.i..Q~J@i~!ltions should be said
to be e~t~;;rls in~1~e~triction of othe~wi~~--e~i~tin~-~~---~___.. ...."-'"'~·

...,~ .....).~

'"

'

-··'--~··

\, ~porate power and not ackno:ledgments thereof.
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The answer to these absurdities
implied corporate power exists.

IS

that no such

Although there are these numerous states where enactments have been passed to "legalize the practice" of
corporate giving, as the American Bar Association committee report states, Appellant points to only one state,
New~Jersey, where the power was held to apply retrospectively to a pre-existing corporation and in the decision in that case, which will hereinafter be discussed at
some length, the court held that under the law of New
Jersey the !lo'Y~~~ exist~~ ind~p_endently of the statute.
Completely understandable is the justification for a
broad and unlimited power to donate when, but only when,
a statute is given prospective application for under such
--=-·---._.
circumstances it lies within the power of the incorporators and stockholders to prescribe in their articles of
incorporation those limitations and restrictions which
they deem to be advisable and proper in their stockholdercorporation and stockholder inter se contract.
The language of the Section 16-2-14(8) specifying
corporate power
''To make donations for the public welfare or for
charitable, scientific, religious or educational
purposes''
is wholly lacking in any declaration that it is to be applied to pre-existing corporations just as its broad language is silent and expresses no limitation whatsoever
which would preclude diieefOrsirom making donations of
9
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10 per cent or 50 per cent or any other per cent of the
corporate income or assets.
Appellant states (Appl. Br. 15) that "every exercise
of the donative power is subject to the rule of 'reasonable
business judgment.' '' What is the standard by which
"business judgment" is to be measured~ If it is to have
any meaning whatsoever it must mean that any action
taken by the corporation must have a reasonable and
reasonably identifiable relation to the furtherance and
accomplishment of the objects and purposes for which
the corporation was formed. It has been the application
of this very standard of ''reasonable business judgment''
which has been the basis for the recognition of the rule
that
''A gift of its property by a corporation not created for charitable purposes is in violation of the
rights of its stockholders and is ultra vires however worthy of encouragement or aid the object
of the gift may be.'' Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations Perm. Ed. Section 2939, p. 667.
If it be said that what Appellant refers to as the "donative power" has become, as a result of the enactment of
Section 16-2-14(8), one of the corporate objects and purposes, then wherein would be found the limitation upon
an enthusiastic sponsoring of that newly added corporate object of charity and general (not stockholder) welfare 1 If as Appellant contends that statutory enactment
can convert a busin<.'ss corporation into a partly business
and party eleemosynary corporation, and if such a conversion does not constitute a fundamental change in the
-~:.··

10

~

___.._

__...~
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corporate objects and purposes as Appellant appears to
contend, then what could constitute a fundamental change.
Appellant points out (Appl. Br. 16-18) that Appellant corporation was originally incorporated under the
Act of January 22, 1897 (L. 1897, Ch. 1, p. 13) and refers
to an enactment (L. 1901, Ch. 26) revising the Utah statutes as to railroad corporations and to Sections 434 and
434x of the Compiled Laws of Utah 1907 which have, in
substance, been carried forward into Sections 56-1-5 and
56-1-1 of Utah Code Annotated, 1953. In reference to these
laws Appellant states
"The foregoing provisions of the Utah railroad
law, were of course in force in 1945 when the appellant's corporate life was extended by amendment to its articles of association and they thus
form a part of the contract between the appellant
and its stockholders embodied in such articles.''
Respondents fully agree with the premise that statutes in force at the time of an extension of corporate existence become a part of the corporation-stockholder contract at that time. It appears to be Appellant's contention
that because the Act (L.1907, Ch. 93) declared an express
legislative intent to give to that particular enactment
retrospective application and because that specific railroad corporation enactment has been carried forward
into present law, the legislative intent so there expressed
in 1907 is to be carried over as constituting an expression
of legislative intent in respect to a 1955 enactment modifying the general corporation laws. If there could be,
and Respondents submit that there cannot be, any merit in
11
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such a contention then it would appear that Appellant
must contend that Section 16-2-14(8) should be construed
as having a retrospective effect in relation to railroad
corporations because of the provision in the said railroad
corporation act although there is no justification whatever
for giving any such a retrospective effect to that section
as to corporations other than railroad corporations.

-----

Our Utah Legislature has left no room for doubt as
to the manner in which statutes are to be construed in
relation to prospective or retrospective application. Section 68-3-3 U.C.A., 1953, definitively and concisely states,

I

I

l __

''No part of these revised statutes is retroactive,
unless expressly so declared.''

The same language is found in the Utah Code Annotated,
1943, Section 88-2-3; and in the Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, Section 88-2-3; and in the Compiled Laws of Utah,
1917, Section 5840; and in the Compiled Laws of Utah,
1907, Section 2490; and in the Revised Statutes of Utah
1898, Section 2490.
The case of Petersen v. State Tax Commission, 106
Utah 337, 148 P. 2d 340 (1944) involved a question of
whether a statute amending a section of the 1943 Utah
Code Annotated was to be applied retroactively. The
appellant therein sought, through reference to another
existing section of the same title of the Code, to attribute
to the Legislature an intention to give retrospective
application to the amendment in question - just as in
the case at bar Appellant seeks to attribute such an intention to the Legislature by reason of other existing statu12
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tory provisions. This Court rejected the contention and,
after quoting our Utah Code provision that:
''No part of these revised statutes is retroactive,
unless expressly so declared''
stated {106 Utah 339-341, 148 P. 2d 341-342):
"That this court is committed to the general
rule can not be questioned, for in the case of Mercur Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. Spry, County
Collector, 16 Utah 222, 52 P. 382, 384, Judge
Miner said:
'Constitutions, as well as statutes, should op-,
erate prospectively only, unless the words
"'employed show a clear intention that they
slioulanave i retroactive effect. This rule of
.-construction should always be adhered to,
unless there be something on .the face of the
statute putting it beyond doubt that tb.e leg1s·lature meant it to operate retrospectively,
Cooley, Const. Lim., p. 73; Suth. St. Const., §§
463-465.'
*

*

*

*

*

"Had the legislature intended Sec. 80-12-7,
Laws of Utah 1943, to have a retroactive effect, it
is reasonable to suppose they would have made
such a declaration in the amendment. The force of
this is more apparent in view of the holding by this
court in the case above cited, and by reason of Sec.
88-2-3, U.C.A. 1943. In view of the decision of this
court heretofore mentioned and the existence of
the statute cited above, both of which were in existence when this enactment was passed by the legislature, and the failure of that body to expressly
declare in said enactment that it should have a
retroactive application, can it be said without
doubt and conjecture what the legislature intended respecting the retroactive effect of the
amendment in question 1
13
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"We are forced to the conclusion that the intention of the legislature is doubtful and that
Judge Miner's pronouncement of the law, above
mentioned, is applicable to the situation before us.
With this in mind and the positive wording of Sec.
88-2-3, U.C.A. 1943, the general rule of construction of statutes must apply and we come to the
conclusion that Sec. 80-12-7, Laws of Utah 1943, is
not retroactive, but was intended by the legislature
to be effective on and after the 11th day of May,
1943, and only those estates whose creators die on
and after said date are entitled to the deduction
provided therein.''
In McCa.rrey v. Utah State Teachers Retirement
Board et al, 177 P. 2d 725, 726; 111 Utah 251, 253-254
( 1947), this Court stated :
"Ordinarily legislative enactments are intended to operate prospectively and not retrospectively. As said in 50 Am. Jr. 494, Statutes, Section
478: 'The question whether a statute operates
retrospectively, or prospectiYely only, is one of
legislative intent. In determining such intent, the
courts have evolved a strict rule of construction
against a retrospective operation, and indulge in
the presumption that the legislature intended statutes, or amendments thereof, enacted by it to operate prospectively only, and not retroactively.
Indeed, the general rule is that they are to be so
construed, where they are susceptible of such interpretation and the intention of the legislature
can be satisfied thereby, where such interpretation
does not produce results which the legislature may
be presumed not to haYe intended, and where the
intention of the legislature to make the statute
retroactive is not stated in express terms, or
dearly, explicitly, positiYely, unequivocally, unmistakably, and unambiguously shown by neces14
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sary implication or terms which permit no other
meaning to be annexed to them, preclude all
question in regard thereto, and leave no reasonable
doubt thereof. Ordinarily, an intention to give a
statute a retroactive operation will not be inferred.
If it is doubtful whether the statute or amendment
was intended to operate retrospectively, the doubt
would be resolved against such operation. * * *' ''
Appellant's argument as to the applicability of the
1955 enactment to the Union Pacific Railroad Company
does violence to the rule of construction which this Court
has announced.
The very doubts as to the constitutionality of any
attempt to apply the statute retroactively (which doubts
were in part the basis of this lawsuit) further argue
against attributing to the legislature an intention that
the enactment have retrospective application.
b. The application to Appellant corporation of the

statutory power to donate would constitute a
fundamental change in the shareholders' contract embodied in Appellant's charter. Thus,
Constitutional objections (U. B. Canst., Art. I,
Sec. 10, Cl. 1; Utah Canst., Art. I, Sec. 18)
preclude application of the statute to Appellant,
a pre-existing corporation.
The tri-partite nature of the contract embodied in a
corporate charter ( [1] between state and corporation,
[2] between corporation and its shareholders, and [3]
between shareholders inter se) and the historical background of Section 1 of Article XII of the Utah Constitu15
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tion, relating to the rights thereunder reserved to the
legislature to alter, amend or repeal laws relating to corporations, were discussed at length .by this Court in
Garey v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah 497,91 P. 367 (1907).
That case is the only case which has decided the
question of the scope of the reserved power of the legislature under Article XII of the Utah Constitution, although several later Utah cases made reference to such
reserved power without having to base decision thereupon. The decision in each such later case was based upon
the fact that the statute involved was in effect when the
corporate charter was granted, or extended, and that
such statute therefore constituted a part of the corporation-stockholder contract.
The decision in the Garey case (the thoroughness of
the consideration of which is amply demonstrated in the
decision on appeal written by Justice Straup and the
decision on rehearing written by Justice Frick) clearly
and directly sets out that the reserved power of the Utah
legislature "is not without limit" (32 Utah 523, 91 P.
378) and that the Court's holding "is supported by the
great weight of authority and is founded upon well established legal principles." (32 Utah 523, 91 P. 378.) The
Utah law in effect in 1897, when St. Joe Mining Co., the
company involved in the Garey case. was incorporated,
prohibited amendments in corporate articles to make nonassessable stock assessable ''without the consent of all
the stockholders in writing.'' Subsequently, in 1903 (L.
1903, Oh. 94, p. 80) the Utah Legislature changed that law
16
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to permit such an amendment by a vote of "at least twothirds of the outstanding capital stock,'' and in 1905
(L. 1905, Ch. 30, p. 29) the Legislature changed the required vote to ''a majority of the outstanding stock.'' It
can hardly be doubted that the Legislature in making
these changes had concluded that broad public interest
warranted modification of the Utah corporation laws by
liberalizing the right of charter amendment. Unfounded
is Appellant's assertion (Appl. Br. 35) that said statutory
enactments ''did not purport to be for the benefit of the
public." It was urged in the Ga.rey case that there was a
public interest in "having the resources of the state developed" and "in promulgating wholesome laws" and,
toward those ends, of permitting assessments in view of
protection which might thereby be afforded to the corporate enterprise and to stockholders and creditors considerations which, among others, doubtless induced the
legislatures to adopt the liberalizing amendments. However, in holding that the amendments did not apply to
pre-existing corporations, the Court, in its decision on
rehearing, said inter alia:
"We held that the Legislature, under the reservation, may alter or amend the contract with reference to the state and in which it is interested, but
that it may not make a material or fundameniafcliange ofthe contract whiCh alone concerns the
c.or~tion and its members.'' (32-- Utah 523, 91
P. 378) ------------ -

*
*
*
''If any one thing pertinent to the question under
consideration is well settled by the authorities, it
is that the power which may be exercised under
the reservation is not without limit, and that there
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is a strong tendency in the decisions to limit the
power of the Legislature to amend the charter
under the reservation." (32 Utah 523, 91 P. 378)
*
"It is of the utmost importance in this connection
to keep in mind the fact that this limitation is not
merely to prevent the confiscation of property, or
to affect or destroy vested rights without due
process of law (as these matters are controlled by
other constitutional provisions), but the limitation
is expressly based upon the narrower ground,
namely, the im airment of contractual rights and
obligations." (32 Utah 524,
. 79
.,---·~-

Appellant asserts (Appl. Br. 24) that investing a corporation with power to use corporate income and assets
"to make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific, religious or for educational purposes'' is
not a fundamental change in the corporate charter.
Appellant cites no supporting authority for this assertion. It is indeed strange that the Utah Legislature (and
40 other legislatures) would have passed a special enactment to add that give-away power to the statutory enumeration of permissible exercises of corporate power if
there was not considered to be some basic and fundamental alteration through its addition. An analogous
observation is made in TVeede Y. Emma Copper Co., 58
Utah 524 at 531, 200 P. 517 at 520 (1921).
Appellant's argument (Appl. Br. 24-:27) as to the
right of stockholders to amend articles of incorporation
so as to add to the corporate purposes or extend the corporate powers is wholly without relevancy since the
Union Pacific stockholders have not acted to add to
18
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Appellant's purposes eleemosynary activity or to extend
the corporate powers and business to the giving away of
corporate assets. Appellant's stockholders have not
amended Appellant's articles to include among its objects
the formation and financing, with Railroad Company
funds, of'' a company-established charitable foundation.''
Just how fundamentally the objects and purposes of the
Foundation depart from those of Appellant will stand
out by comparison of the respective articles. Appellant
contends that, without stockholder action but with corporate funds, the financing of the Foundation is within the
scope of the Union Pacific corporation - stockholder
contract.
The question in this case is not what the stockholders
can do through amendment of the corporation-stockholder contract but, rather, whether the Legislature by
its 1955 enactment, and independent of stockholder action,
intended to retrospectively alter the corporation-stockholder contract, and whether, if any such unexpressed
intention be imputed to the Legislature, the legislative
attempt to alter the corporation-stockholder contract
could be constitutional.
Appellant cites (Appl. Br. 27) Salt L(})ke City Automobile Co. v. Keith O'Brien Co., et al, 45 Utah 218, 143
P. 1015 (1914), in support of its contention. That case
involved the validity of an amendment of the Automobile
Company's articles of incorporation increasing the capitalization and providing for preferred stock. The Court
pointed out that the section of the Utah corporation law
19
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respecting the authority to amend articles of incorporation was "in force at the time the company was organized" and that the section of the Utah corporation law
conferring authority upon corporations to classify their
capital stock ''was in force when the company was
organized,'' and stated:
''It would seem, therefore, that not only is the Legislature by the Constitution authorized to amend
all laws relating to corporations within the limits
pointed out by this court in Garey v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.)
554, but the right to amend the articles of incorporation by the majority of the stockholders, with
the exceptions stated in section 338, supra, is expressly given. That section is as much a part of
the articles of incorporation as though it were specifically referred to or set forth at large therein."
( 45 Utah 222, 143 P.1016-17) (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that in the Salt Lake Automobile Co. case
there was not involved (as there is in the case at bar and
as there was in the Garey case) an attempt to give retrospective application to a legislative modification of the
corporation law. It is likewise clear that the Court recognized that any legislative amendment of the corporation
laws could only be sustained "within the limits pointed
out by'' this Court in the Garey case.
Appellant cites (Appl. Br. 25, 27) Fower v. Provo
Bench Carn.al & Irrigat·ion Co., 99 Utah 267, 101 P. 2d 375
( 1940). Said case has no relevancy to the issues in this
case. The corporate life of the Irrigation Company involved in that case would have expired in 1937 except for
20
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an extension of the corporate life effected through an
amendment of its articles adopted by its stockholders in
1937. Referring to these circumstances, the Court said:
"Hence, the laws in force at the time of the extension of the corporate life (1937) formed a part of
the contract between the corporation and its stockholders.'' ( 99 Utah 272, 101 P. 2d 377)
The question involved in the Fower case was the validity
of certain amendments to the articles of incorporation of
the Irrigation Company which had been adapted by its
stockholders after 1937 and which empowered the Irrigation Company to acquire additional water distribution
facilities, to enter into water acquisition contracts, to encumber its property, to pay its debts, to purchase stock in
other corporations, to purchase its own stock and to
assess its stock for corporate purposes.
The Court pointed out that Section 18-2-44, R.S.U.
1933 (now Section 16-2-45, U.C.A. 1953, referred to in
Appellant's Brief page 25) was in effect when the corporate life was extended as above mentioned, and as to the
controversial amendments of the articles stated :
"We hold such amendments to be in conformity
with Section 18-2-44, R. S.· U. 1933, which reads in
part: '* * * the adding to the purposes or object
or extending the powe~ and bus_iness of the corporation shall not be deemed a change-of the original
purpose of the corporation * * *' " (99 Utah 274,
101 P. 2d 378)
That the case had no application whatever to the
question of an attempt, such as is involved in the instant
21
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case, to give retrospective effect to legislation is clearly
set forth in the following statement by the Court:
"The holding hereinabove to the effect that the
laws in force in 1937 at the time of the extension
of the corporate life formed a part of the contract
between the corporation and its stockholders renders unnecessary a discussion of respondents' contention, and the lower court's conclusion, that the
amendments to the articles constitute an impairment of contract in violation of Article I, Section
18, of the Constitution of the state of Utah, and
of Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution of the
United States. No contention is made that legislation subsequent to 1937 is involved in this controversy." (99 Utah 278, 101 P. 2d 380)
(

\
1
"-·

Novel and unsupported is Appellant's contention
(Appl. Br. 24) that power to make gifts "could have been
engrafted on the Appellant's charter by shareholder
amendment'' and that therefore it could be inserted in the
charter by "legislative amendment" and without stockholder action.
Appellant's proposition (Appl. Br. 27) is in substance this :
(1) Since Appel_lant 's Articles of Association authorized extension of the corporate powers
through the filing of amended Articles of Association ; and
(2) Since the Utah statutes (which became a part
of Appellant's ehartcr in 1945 when its corporate
existence was extended) contain broad provisions
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(Section 16-2-45) permitting amendments by action of a majority of the stockholders; therefore
(3) It follows that the Legislature can itself insert
into Appellant's charter any new powers which
its stockholders could add through their own and
voluntary action.
Said Section 16-2-45 related solely to stockholder
amendments of articles of incorporation and the fact that /
the 1905 legislature, in providing an exception to the 1
requirement of unanimous consent for changes in corporate purposes, used the rather awkward medium of stating that certain permitted changes should not be deemed
changes cannot alter the fact that that section applies
only to stockholder amendments and that, under any other
circumstances, including legislative action, a change is a
change. In each Utah case where an amendment to corporate articles has been upheld under the provisions of
Section 16-2-45, or its predecessor section, the provisions
.
-- -·---permitting the amendment wer~J~effect when the cor-porate charter was granted or extended and were therefore a part of the corporation-stockholder contract. The
addition of the power to donate would represent a change
and alteration in the corporation-stockholder contract of
t~ -ir~i~~ -:P;-cifi~--R~ilroad Company.
~-~··-····-- ---·~·----- ·~

~

In the Garey case this Court held that an amendment
of corporate articles to provide power to assess corporate stock could only be made with the unanimous consent
of the stockholders required under the law in effect when
the company was incorporated; and that subsequent leg-
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islative action could not obviate the necessity of consent
by all of the stockholders. Exercise of the power of
amendment of corporate articles permitted under the
present Section 16-2-45 requires consent and approval by
a majority of the stockholders yet App~llaE~ co:nt~~ds that
the Legislature may not only retrospectively ohviate the
~ -IJ-ecessity for that coll.~~~t--~~t__:r:rt.iiY_it_~-~!f _write into the
articles ·a.n: amendDj_i~t:withont-thQ cgnsent of aJlY gf the
) "stOckhofdern~------ ---Appellant's witnesses testified that indirect benefits would accrue to Appellant from philanthropic donations of corporate funds since such contributions would
contribute to the preservation of what the Appellant
refers to as ''a favorable economic and social environment." In the Ga.rey case, it was claimed that the corporation would benefit through an assessment and that
its creditors, stockholders and the public would benefit
from the financial fortification of the corporation. Nevertheless~ this Court declared that the i~~~grity of the corporation-~!~c~~_9ld~contr~cl could not be impaired
through retrospective application of legislation to a preexisting corporation.
e. The exercise by .Appellant's Directors of the

asserted power to donate constitutes a riolation and impairment of the corporation-stockholder contract, such power not having been
given in the articles of incorporation or by the
statutes in effect in 1945 when the life of .Appellant corporation was extended.
24
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In its effort to avoid the controlling effect of this
Court's decision in the Garey case Appellant asserts
(Appl. Br. 29} that this Court in Cowan et al v. Salt Lake
Hardware Co., 118 Utah 300, 221 P. 2d 625 (1950), recognized ''the broad scope of the state's reserved power
under the Massachusetts rule.'' Respondent';s~brit that
the Cowan case does not mention the Garey case or indicate any departure from its rule. Neither does the Cowan
case make any reference to any ''Massachusetts rule.''
The Cowa;n case involved an amendment of the
articles of Salt Lake Hardware Co. whereby non-callable
preferred stock was made callable. At the time Salt Lake
Hardware Co. was incorporated the Utah statutes permitted amendment by a vote of ''at least two-thirds of the
outstanding capital stock.'' Subsequently, but prior to
the amendment there in question, the statute was modified
to permit amendment by ''at least a majority of the outstanding stock." However, the Court pointed out that
the amendment in question was made "with more than
two-thirds of its outstanding stock voting in its favor."
Immediately following the quotation from the Cowan
case decision set out on pages 29-30 of Appellant's Brief,
this Court in said decision (quoting from Keetch v. Cordner,' 90 Utah 423, 62 P. 2d 273, 275) reasserted the established principle that:
"The law which was in existence at the time the
articles of agreement were entered into became a
part thereof.'' ( 118 Utah 304, 221 P. 2d 627)
/
/'
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In its quotation from the Cowan case, Appellant gave
italicized emphasis to the following sentence:
''However interesting this historical background
is, it is now well settled that such constitutional
and statutory provisions authorizing amendments
of Articles of Incorporation do not only pertain as
to the relationship between the state and the corporation, but pertain to the rights between the
corporation and its stockholders." (118 Utah 304,
221 P. 2d 627)
But there is nothing in the Cowam case, including the
last above quoted extract from its decision, which is in
conflict with the rule of the Garey case wherein this Court
said:
''Is it an answer to say that, the reserved power of
the state being general, therefore it applies to all
changesof every kina and nature· that may affect
the powers, rights and privileges of the cOrporation and of the stockholders with regard to their
relation with one another? The law no doubt can
. be changed with regard to all these matters; ·buf

ir-does-not follow

t1Uii_-it

_1iw.y

be done so as to

a/Jeer past transactions or vested rights.'.:., (32
a 527, 91 P. 380)- (Emphasis- supplied)
This Court in the Cow am case did not and had no
occasion to include in its statement any reference to retrospective application of legislation for the simple reason
that it was not confronted with any attempt to give
retrospective application to any statute.
In support of its contention Appellant cites (Appl.
Br. 36) Millerv. The State, 15 Wall478 (1873). That case
involved a special statute which authorized the City of
26
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Rochester to invest $300,000 in stock of Genesee Valley
Railroad Company with provision that the City was to
appoint one director for each $75,000 so invested. It was
contemplated that others who had subscribed $977,500
would elect the remaining nine of the specified thirteen
directors. Such other subscribers defaulted on their subscriptions to the extent that only $255,200 was subscribed
by them. The legislature then amended such special statute to provide for City appointment of one director for
each $42,855.57 subscribed and paid by the City.
The United States Supreme Court pointed out in
the Miller case that the result of the amendment was only
to carry into effect the purpose of the original legislation
and that the proportion of City directors and City contribution to total directors and total contribution had not
been altered by the subject legislation. Said Court further stated in the Miller case with respect to the reserved
power of the legislature that:
"Such a reservation, it is held, will not warrant
the legislature in passing laws to change the control of an institution from one religious sect to
another, or to divert the fund of the donors to any
new use inconsistent with the intent and purpose
of the charter, or to compel subscribers to the
stock, whose subscription is conditional, to waive
any of the conditions of their contract." (15 Wall
498) (Emphasis supplied)
In support of this statement the said Court cited (among
other authorities) the Zabriskie case which this Court
cited in the Garey case.
27
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Appellant also cites (Appl. Br. 36) Looker v. MO!!J'Yir
ard, 179 U.S. 46, 21 S. Ct. 21 (1900). It should be enough
to say that this Court in the Garey case found nothing
inconsistent between the rule of the Looker case and its
own decision in the Garey case, because in the Garey case
it cited and relied in part upon the Looker case (32 Utah
510, 91 P. 373).
Appellant cites (Appl. Br. 36) Greenwood v. Freight
Co., 105 U. S. 13 (1881). That case involved a special
statute expressly repealing a charter (and therefore relating expressly to the state-corporation contract) which
had been granted to Marginal Freight Railroad Co. by
an earlier special statute. At the time such earlier special
grant of corporate existence had been made the Massachusetts statute expressly provided that:
" 'Every act of incorporation passed after the
eleventh day of ~farch, in the year one thousand
eight hundred and thirty-one, shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal, at the pleasure
of the legislature.' " (105 U. S. 17)
The United States Supreme Court in the Greenwood case
said:
''This expression, 'the pleasure of the legislature,'
is significant, and is not found in many of the similar statutes in other States.
"This statute having been the settled law of
Massachusetts, and representing her policy on an
important subject for nearly fifty years before the
incorporation of the Marginal Compa11y, we cannot
doubt the authority of the legislature of Massachusetts to repeal that charter. Nor is this serious28
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ly questioned by counsel for appellant; and it may,
therefore, be assumed that if the repealing clause
of the act of May 6, 1872, stood alone, its validity
must be conceded." (105 U. S. 17-18) (Emphasis
supplied)
Said Court then discussed at some length the provision
of said special1872 statute which related to the taking of
possession of the trackage of the Company whose charter
had been so repealed upon payment of compensation
therefor.
Appellant cites (Appl. Br. 36) Polk v. Mutual Reserve Fund, 207 U. S. 310, 28 S. Ct. 65 (1907). In that
case an insurance company, incorporated upon a ''cooperative or assessment plan," made a reorganization
under an insurance company act which permitted it to
write life insurance of every kind. The complainants were
holders of policies issued prior to such reorganization
and as such were members of the association.
In holding that constitutional rights were not violated in the amendment the United States Supreme Court
said:
''The corporation was not changed to a stock, but
continued as a mutual, company. The change of
name cannot control the significance of these facts.
We answer this and the other questions upon the
assumption, therefore, that the old corporation
was still in existence, under a new name, and with
added powers, but with unchanged membership,
and bound to perform all its existing obligations.
Upon this view it is impossible to say that any of
the contract obligations of the association to the
29
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complainwnts have been impaired by the reorgarnization." (28 S. Ct. 70) (Emphasis supplied)
That case dealt with rights and obligations under insurance policies which were not altered by the amendment
there in question.
Appellant cites (Appl. Br. 36) Stockholders v. Sterlilng, 300 U. S. 175, 57 S. Ct. 386 (1937). That case involved an amendment in a banking corporation act
imposing a liability upon stockholders and directors. The
act had as a part of the very sentence which imposed the
liability the specific "condition that this Act and every
part of it may be altered from time to time, or repealed
by the legislature." As to the question of whether the
legislative amendment was unconstitutional the United
States Supreme Court said:
"The answer must be 'no,' and this for two rea~
sons, first, because the changes are directed to the
implementing remedies rather than the substantive liability, and, second, because a change of substantive liability was made permissible by the
reservation of a power of alteration or repeal."
(57 S. Ct. 389)
Appellant cites (Appl. Br. 36) Y eix Y. Sixth lfard
Assoc., 310 U. S. 32, 60 S. Ct. 792 (1940). That case involved a legislative amendment of an enactment expressly
relating to withdrawal of shares in a building and loan
association. The United States Supreme Court said:
''We are dealing here with financial institutions
of major importance to the credit system of the
State.
30
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"With institutions of such importance to its
economy, the State retains police powers adequate
to authorize the enactment of statutes regulating
the withdrawal of shares." (60S. Ct. 794)
Appellant cites (Appl. Br. 37) St. Louis, Iron Mountain& Railwayv. Paul, 173 U.S. 404,19 S. Ct. 419 (1899).
This is another case involving a specific enactment in
regulation of a public utility. This case involved an act
which required (under certain penalties) that a discharged railroad employee be paid, on the day of discharge, unpaid wages then earned. Mere statement of
the case should show its inapplicability. The United
States Supreme Court said:
''This act
operation. ''

was

purely

prospective

in

its

* * *
''In this case the act was passed 'for the protection of servants and employees of railroads,' and
was upheld as an amendment of railroad charters,
such exercise of the power reserved being justifie~ on public considerations, and a duty was spe- '
cially imposed, for the failure to discharge which
the penalty was inflicted. " ( 19 S. Ct. 421)
Erie RR Co. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685, 34 S. Ct. 761
(1914), (Appl. Br. 37) is another case involving railroad
regulation in which the Court upheld a statute which required semi-monthly payment of railroad employees. In
this case the Court said, "Plaintiff now pays monthly.
The extent of its grievance, therefore, is two payments a
month instead of one.'' The Court concluded that considerations of public interest permitted the state, in the exer31
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cise of its police and reserve powers, to impose this railway labor regulation.
In Sutton v. New Jersey, 244 U.S. 258, 37 S. Ct. 508
(1917), which Appellant cites in its Brief at page 37,
the question presented was the validity of a statute requiring street railway companies to grant free transportation to police officers while engaged in the performance
of their public duties. The Court held that the act was
not ''an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the police
power'' and concluded its opinion with the following
statement:
"The statute is broad in scope, extending also to
all 'uniformed public officers;' but the court below
expressly confined its decision to the case presented, sustaining the law 'in so far as it applies
to police officers ; ' and our decision is likewise so
limited." (37 S. Ct. 508)
How can that case dealing with an express obligation imposed "upon street-using corporations" have relevancy
to the issues in the case at bar?
Also relied upon by Appellant (Appl. Br. 37) is
Home Building & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,
54 S. Ct. 231 (1934). That case involved the constitutionality of the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law which
was "temporary in operation'' and "limited to the exigency which called it forth." The statute applied to
natural persons as well as to corporations and in no way
involved state reserved powers in reference to amendment of corporation laws. The decision relates to state
32
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retention or "reservation of essential elements of sovereignty" under which the state possesses "authority to
safeguard the vital interests of its people.'' In upholding
the legislation the Court said :
''An emergency existed in Minnesota which furnished a proper occasion for the exercise of the reserved power of the state to protect the vital interests of the community.''
The Court expressly recognized the existence of an emergency as the foundation for the legislation and said:
"It is always open to judicial inquiry whether the
exigency still exists upon which the continued operation of the law depends. " (54 S. Ct. 244)
It is of interest to note the extent to which the cases
upon which Appellant relies relate to the continued existence or regulation of corporations dealing directly with
the public interest. Said cases have reference to public
utility franchises or to state regulation of insurance,
banking or other financial institutions where there was a
direct and clear interest in the protection of the public
through the enfranchisement, disenfranchisement or regulatory aspects of the legislation.
Throughout Appellant's Brief repeated reference is
made to A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, 13
N.J. 145, 98 A. 2d 581 (1953). That repeated reference is
understandable for the Smith case represents a departure
from established law and such a departure is necessary to
the sustaining of Appellant's contentions. That the Smith
case did represent a departure from established law in
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general, and from established New Jersey law in particular, is clear from the decision of the New Jersey Supreme
Court wherein it is said that "the later cases in New Jersey have not disavowed the doctrine of the Zabriskie
case.'' In brushing aside the New Jersey Court's decision
in the Zabriskie case, the New Jersey Court in the Smith
case said:
"Unfortunately, the court did not consider whether it was not contrary to the public interest to permit the single minority stockholder before it to
restrain the railroad's normal corporate growth
and development as authorized by the Legislature
and approved, reasonably and in good faith, by
the corporation's managing directors and majority stockholders." (98 A. 2d 588)
This Court in the Garey case discussed the express
question of ''whether the legislature had the authority
to confer such a power (of amending articles to make nonassessable stock assessable) upon any number of stockholders less th(}Jn the whole," and held that the Utah Legislature did not have such power as to "corporations
existing when the law was passed." (32 Utah 505, 91
P. 371)
One of the fundamental principles of law is protection of an individual and of a minority against action by
a majority. Constitutions are written to circumscribe
what a legislature may do.
The case at bar involves no principle of sovereign
exercise of power to prohibit acts or to impose obligations
in the public interest. It involves the question of whether
34
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the Legislature may enact legislation which will permit a
corporation as one party to an existing corporation-stockholder contract, at its election and not by imposed requirements, to disregard the contractual rights of the other
party, the stockholders. If vital public interest were involved, there would be no more justification for permitting 51 per cent of the stockholders, or a majority of the
directors, to defeat that public purpose than there would
be for permitting one per cent of the stockholders or one
director from defeating public purposes. The answer is
that the Utah Legislature did not require anything. All
it did (assuming that, contrary to established construction principles, we impute to the Legislature an intention
of retrospective application) was to attempt to permit
corporate exercise of a power not permitted under the
corporation-stockholder contract - a power to give away
corporate assets.

(

d. The asserted statutory power to donate operates as a deprivation of the shareholders' property without due process of law. (U. S. Canst.,
14th Amend., Sec.1; Utah Canst., Art. I, Sec. 7.)
In support of its contention that the giving away by
Appellant's Directors of corporate income and assets under circumstances where neither the corporate charter
nor the laws in effect in 1945 when Appellant's corporate
life was extended authorized the donation- did not operate as deprivation of stockholders' property without due
process of law, Appellant cites (Appl. Br. 41) A. P.
Smith Ma;n,ufacturing Co. v. Ba,rlow, 26 N. J. Super. 106,
97 A. 2d 186 ( 1953). In this case (which has been above
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I

referred to and which will be hereinafter more fully discussed), the New Jersey Superior Court baldly asserted:
''Nor does the legislation in question offend the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.'' (97 A. 2d 194)
citing for its assertion only the cases discussed in the preceding section of this Brief and Marcus Brown Holding
Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 41 S. Ct. 465 (1921). The
Marcus Brown case, like the other cited cases, not only
fails to support the proposition for which cited but is
wholly irrele-vant.
In the Marcus Brown case the United States Supreme
Court upheld an emergency enactment prohibiting for a
specified time the dispossession of tenants. The decision
in the Marcus Brown case is brief and Respondents urge
that this Court read that decision in order to observe
how completely it fails to give any support to the constitutionality of retrospective application of the 1955 Utah
enactment which is involved in the instant case.
Any reference in this Brief to retrospective application of the 1955 donation enactment should not be read
as indicating that Respondents concede that such enactment has or was intended to have retrospective application. The enactment makes no provision for retrospective application and a. construction of its general
terms as imputing such an intent to the Legislature violates not only the express rule of statutory construction
written by the Legislature into our Utah Code (Section

36
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68-3-3 U.C.A., 1953) but also long established common law
rules of statutory construction as hereinabove pointed out.
To the extent that Appellant's corporate income and
assets are given away by the Directors, the corporate
assets, which constitute the basic value of the stock, the
property right of Appellant's stockholders, are reduced
and funds available for corporate capital or dividend distribution are decreased.
The interest of the stockholder-owners of a corporation in the underlying assets of the corporation was described in the Garey case as follows :
''Every stockholder has a vested equity in and to
the assets of the corporation.'' ( 32 Utah 520, 91
P. 377)
This same fundamental concept was expressed in
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 3 A.L.R. 413,
434 (1919) by the Michigan Supreme Court as follows:
''The capital stock of a corporation is always representative of the net assets of the corporation,
whatever they may be, * * *, because it is representative of an aliquot part of the net assets of
the corporation." (3 A.L.R. 434)
A reduction and decrease of corporate assets through
gifts is not authorized under Appellant's corporationstockholder contract. Appellant's stockholders have never
acted nor have they ever been consulted as to the donation power alteration of the corporation-stockholder contract to which they are party. Such procedure is wholly
wanting in any respect of due process.
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II

The contribution to the Union Pacific Foundation
does not represent a valid exercise by Appelloot of
an implied corporate power.
"In Zion's Savings Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Tropic & East
Fork Irr. Co. this Court held that Article XII, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution, which provides
that 'No corporation shall engage in any business
other than that expressly authorized in its charter or articles of incorporation,' requires that a
strict interpretation be given to the Articles of Incorporation.''
Respondents fully concur in this foregoing statement
made by Appellant on page 42 of its Brief. As recently
as 1953 this Court in Summit Ra;nge & Livestock Co. v.
Rees, 1 U. 2d 195, 198, 265 P. 2d 381, 383, reaffirmed "the
general rule that the corporate powers as outlined in the
charter are subject to strict interpretation'' citing the
Zion's Savings Bank case.
This Court has, of course, recognized that corporations have such- impliea powers, -buf only such implied
powers, as are incidental to -,'the- accol?p~ishi~{llie
general pnrposcs.-2f the corporation as expressed in the
object clause of its articles." Since the Utah Constitution
requires that ''strict interpretation'' be given the powers
and objects expressly set out in the articles of incorporation, it can hardly be rationally urged that implied powers
enlarge expressed powers. So-called implied powers are,
and of necessity must be, but recognition that expressed
powers are usually general in their terms and embrace
38
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the detailed powers necessary for the effectuation of the
expressed powers.
The instant case presents the question of whether
or not it is necessary to the accomplishment of the objects
expressed in the articles of incorporation of Appellant
corporation that Appellant have power to give away corporate income and assets in order to promote the general
welfare by creating what Appellant refers to as a "favorable social and economic environment.'' There exists a
trust relationship between a corporation and its stockholders defined by the corporation-stockholder contract.
Respondents submit that among the most favorable and
important elements of the social and economic environment which have made this nation grow and prosper in
strength and the well-being of its citizens are those constitutional safeguards which were erected to preserve the
integrity of contracts and the protection of property and
property rights. The ultimate objective of our corporate
system is to permit-the aggregation of investments of
many stockholders to he utilized in a system of production
and marketing which would not otherwise be possible.
Appellant in its Brief argues that the power to
donate corporate funds which the 1955 enactment expressed was a power which existed and exists as an
implied power independent of the enactment. In other
words, Appellant argues that the 1955 enactment added
nothing to the corporate powers other than to protect
directors from ''giving or engaging in donative activities
at the risk of expensive litigation" (Appl. Br. 49).
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Wherein resides the risk of litigation, if, as Appellant
asserts (Appl. Br. 48), a corporate donation "represents
a valid exercise of a judicially well recognized implied
corporate power.''
In this connection it will be observed that Appellant
asserts (Appl. Br. 13) that thirty-eight states (in addition to Utah) and the District of Columbia and the Territory of Hawaii have enacted legislation intended to permit corporate donations. If, as Appellant contends, the
fundamental common law as to the scope of implied corporate powers permitted such action, Respondents again
ask why forty-one legislative bodies have enacted such
legislation.
Appellant in its Brief at page 43 states:
''One of the prime duties of the board of directors
of any corporation is, of course, to preserve, maintain, and, to the extent dictated by the requirements of the business, add to the corporate business property. It is no less the duty of any board
of directors to preserve the existence of the corporation itself."
With these assertions Respondents agree. However, in
the Garey case it was argued that corporate assessments
might be needed to preserve the existence of the corporation, and as to this contention this Court said:

~
~

'

"But that is something which the corporators
should consider when they make their contracts.
Courts are organized to enforce contracts as made,
unless they contravene good morals or public policy." (32 Utah 521, 91 P. 377)
40
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In its Brief on pages 45 and 46 Appellant cites a
group of cases which have reference to pension, relief,
hospital, medical, health and disability funds which corporations had created for the benefit of their employees.
The clear relationship of these matters to the employeremployee relations and direct corporate interest can
hardly be more patently illustrated than by the fact that
such matters are an inherent part of labor contracts in
many industries. It is one thing to recognize the direct
interest of a corporation in its labor relations and a
completely different thing to assert that the corporation
has implied power to provide pension, relief, hospital,
medical, health and disability funds for the benefit of
those who have no relation to the corporation other than
as being a part of the general public. (See Note, 3
A.L.R. 443)
Appellant, for some inexplicable reason, cites Hutton
v. West Cork Railway Co., 23 Ch. D. 654, at page 44 of its
Brief. The Hutton case involved an attempted donation
of corporate funds, derived from a sale of the Company's
undertaking, to officials of the Company who as a result
of the sale lost employment and to directors for past services rendered when there was no agreement that they
should be compensated. Even after the donation resolution had been approved by a "large majority" of the
stockholders, the English court enjoined the making of
the donations. While the dictum of that case inferred
that corporate funds might be expended for other than
strictly legal obligations ''as an inducement to (employees) to exert themselves in the future, or as an act
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done reasonably for the purpose of getting the greatest
profit in the business of the company" (page 666), the
English court said '~~~-~rity has no . pla,~e __to si~ at boards
of directors" (page 673). It is difficult to conceive of
Appellanffinding any comfort in the Hutton case.
Appellant also cites (Appl. Br. 46) Armstrong Cork
Co. v. H. A. Meldrum Co. 285 Fed. 58 (1922), in support
of its position. This case is a decision of a federal district court. The case involved donations, by ''a so-called
family corporation" whose capital stock "was owned by
a few persons, all relatives,'' to colleges near the Company's place of business, made with contemplation that
those colleges would engage competent teachers and instruct students in business and industrial affairs, there
being no collegiate institution in the vicinity which presented such opportunity for education. In applying the
rule of permitting acts ''done for the purpose of serving
corporate ends,'' the court said:

''I think the advantage derived was tantamount
to a personal benefit ....
''This rule, it is thought, may be fittingly applied,
especially as neither stockholder nor creditor chalrlenges the right exercised by the officers to make
the contributions." (285 Fed. 59) (Emphasis
supplied)
Throughout Appellant's Brief reference is made, as
above mentioned, to the case of A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145;"9n. 2.d 581, 39 A.L.R.
2a 1179 (1953), wherein the New Jersey Supreme Court
upheld a $1,500 donation made by the Smith Company to
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Princeton University. The case involved a New Jersey
statute enacted in 1953 which authorized every New J ersey corporation "unless otherwise provided in its certificate of incorporation or other certificate filed pursuant
to law or its by-laws'' to make donations for philanthropic, educational and other specified purposes. The
New Jersey statute prescribed certain definite limitations upon the amount which could be given without stockholder approval.
Two important distinctions are apparent between
that New Jersey legislation and the 1955 Utah donation
statute: First, there was in the New Jersey statute language from which there could be attributed to the New
Jersey legislature an intention of retrospective application while the Utah statute contains no such language.
Second, the permissive donation power under the New
Jersey statute was circumscribed by limitations for the
protection of the stockholders while the Utah statute purports to grant an unrestricted donation power.
Respondents concede that the broad language of the
Smith case appears to justify and support in some measure Appellant's contentions as to the validity of the Utah
enactment. In fact, this proceeding and the nature of the
proceeding and the evidence introduced herein reflect an
effort to present parallelism with the Smith case.
In reading the New Jersey Courts' philosophical discourses, sight must not be lost, however, of the fact that
the New Jersey Courts were cognizant of and gave ex43
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press recognition to the :Q_rotective limitations which the
New Jersey enactment prescribed.
The New Jersey Superior Court in its decision ( referred to by the New Jersey Supreme Court as "well
reasoned") stated:
"Limitations are however imposed upon this
granted power of contribution.'' (97 A. 2d 188)
"It cannot be earnestly suggested that the limited
contribution allowed by the statutes in question
'defeats or substantially impairs' the object of
the grant of corporate power to Plaintiff. Even if
it were assumed that the diversion of a corporate
sum within the limits of the statutes does in some
mathematical measure impair the rights of stockholders, it is not a substantial impairment." (97
A. 2d 194) (Emphasis supplied except that the
word ''substantial'' was italicized in the opinion.)
The emphasis which Appellant places upon the Smith
case is readily understandable for the case represents a
striking and startling departure from well established
legal principles. Abrupt departure from established law
and disregard of the rule of construction prescribed in
Section 68-3-3, U.C.A. 1953, is necessary to an upholding
of retrospective application of a statute permitting corporate directors to give away corporate assets without
authority in the charter or the statutes in existence at the
time of creation or extension of the corporate existence.
An example of one of the high-sounding platitudes of
the New Jersey Superior Court will be found in its
assertion that :
''What promotes the general good will inescapably
advance the corporate weal." (97 A. 2d 190)
44
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The vice which inheres in such reasoning upon which the

Smith case is grounded can be shown by a simple analogy :
The State of Utah needs a new building for offices of State
branches of government. A gift of an office building to
the State would no doubt promote the general good, but
would the gift of such a building by its corporate owner
advance that corporation's good wilU The New Jersey
Superior Court's concept of corporate weal is illustrated
in the second sentence following the above quotation
where the New Jersey Court says, ''The benefits derived
from such contributions are nation-wide and promote the
welfare of everyone anywhere in the land.'' No doubt the
benefits derived from tax impositions are nation-wide and
promote the welfare of everyone anywhere in the land,
but does it follow that corporation directors should pay
undue taxes, and would it be said of such overpayments
that because the increased government revenue promotes
the general good will, the corporate weal is thereby inescapably advanced 1 How long could the corporation
endure if directors operated its corporate business on
the premise that whatever promotes the general good
inescapably advances the corporate weaH The platitude
could convert any corporation for profit into a non-profit
corporation. If giving a little promotes the general good
and advances the corporate weal, the greater the giving
the greater the corporate weal.

I

That the New Jersey Supreme Court was aware of
the departure of its decision from established law is indicated by its statement that:
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"The genius of our common law has been its capacity for growth and its adaptability to the needs
of the times. Generally courts have accomplished
the desired result indirectly through the molding
of old forms. Occasionally they have done it directly through frank rejection of the old and recognition of the new." (98 A. 2d 581, 586, 39 A.L.R.
2d 1179 at 1188)
That the New Jersey Court did what it did through
the rejection of the old and the creation of the new stands
out in an analysis of its decision and the cases therein
referred to. However, the decision lacked complete frankness because cases were cited for propositions which they
do not support, as shown by the hereinabove discussion
of those cases.
That the New Jersey Court has chosen to declare
that the integrity of contracts and the protection of constitutional rights were subservient to -public approval of
tlie diversion of corporate funds to charity does not require that this Court adopt a like philosophy. This !J_?urt
-has unequivocally spoken in respect to the law oLtbj.s_
State as to retrospective application of amendments of
our Utah corporation statutes.
Respondents say, as did Lord Justice Bowen in the
Hutton case :
"As soon as a question is raised by a dissentient
shareholder, or by a person standing in the position of a dissentient shareholder, sympathy must
be cut adrift, and we have simply to consider what
the law is.''

46
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If the law is that corporations can, without regard
to their charters and the laws which became a part of
them and without action of the stockholders, make contributions from corporate assets merely because the
benefits derived from such contribution are nation-wide
and promote the welfare of everyone anywhere in the
land, then that law must be found in the Smith case for
nowhere elselri-the niany caseson the subject has its exis- tence been recognized. T-o-the-cuntrary;- it has been repeatedly ·:re-cognizeat1i~(-~~el'e_fi!!!~.Lb~__f?Q~~j_g_(:l!l~le
direct or indirect benefit to the corporation.
,.........__

~··---

The Smith case decision gave much emphasis to the
importance of private institutions of learning. Despite the
broad dicta of the case, what the decision in that case
upheld was a donation of $1,500 made by the Smith Company to Princeton University. As to that donation the
New Jersey Supreme Court said:
"It was made to a pre-eminent institution of
higher learning, was modest in amount and well
within the limitations imposed by the statutory
enactments, and was voluntarily made in the reasonable belief that it would aid the public welfare
and advance the interests of the plaintiff as a private corporation and as part of the community in
which it operates." (98 A. 2d 581, 39 A.L.R. 2d
1179, 1191--2)

What the New Jersey Court did was to affirm a decision which held that a particular gift by a particular
company to a particular university of the community in
which the corporation operated was, under the New J ersey law, within the implied powers of that company.
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There was presented to the United States Supreme Court
upon the appeal (which appeal was dismissed for "want
of a substantial federal question") only what the New
Jersey Court did, not what it said.
A state holding as to the law of that state with respect to the implied powers of a corporation of that state
presents no federal question. Far from upholding the
New Jersey enactment as granting retrospectively a new
power, the New Jersey Supreme Court said:
-

'..
L

an~····

its enactments simply constitute helpful
confirmatory declaration of such (implied corporate) power, accompanied by limiting safeguards.'' ( 39 A.L.R. 2d 1191)
I
In the case at bar Appellant did not, as in the Smith
case, make a gift to an institution of higher learning in
the community in which it operates. Appellant made a
gift of $5,000 to the company-established Union Pacific
Foundation. The Foundation, and not Appellant, determined that, from thus supplied Foundation funds, the
Foundation would give $4,000 to Brigham Young University. It was within the power of the Foundation to give
it for any charitable, educational or scientific project
selected by it. The recipient, had the Foundation so
chosen, could have been anywhere within or without the
United States. When the donation was made to the Union
Pacific Foundation, Appellant had no say as to how or
where the money would be used.

It is inescapably clear that the New Jersey Courts
in the Smith case gave broad interpretation to corporate
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powers. It is equally inescapably clear that this Court
in recognition of the provisions of Section 10 of Article
XII of the Utah Constitution has declared that in Utah
corporate powers must be given ''strict interpretation.''
The New Jersey Court made clear its philosophy '
that constitu_ti_onat barxie-~"~-~~;;·-~~niate-r(Lcllfr~nt__.
concepts of general welfare. Expressive of this new
philo.sophy is the foll~ng statement of the New Jersey
Supreme Court :
''As has been indicated, there is now widespread
belief throughout the nation that free and vigorous non-governmental institutions of learning are
vital to our democracy and the system of free enterprise and that withdrawal of corporate authority to make such contributions within reasonable
limits would seriously threaten their continuance.
Corporations have come to recognize this and
with their enlightenment have sought in varying
measures, as has the plaintiff by its contribution,
to insure and strengthen the society which gives
them existence and the means of aiding themselves
and their fellow citizens. Clearly then, the appellants, as individual stockholders whose private
interests rest entirely upon the well-being of the
Plaintiff corporation, ought not be permitted to
close their eyes to present-day realities and thwart
the long-visioned corporate action in recognizing
and voluntarily discharging its high obligations as
a constituent of our modern social structures.''
( 39 A.L.R. 2d 1192)

In sharp contra~ to that new concept is the established law as expressed by the Supreme Court of Michi49
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gan in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 3 A.L.R.
440 (1919), where that court said:
''The difference between an incidental humanitarian expenditure of corporate funds for the
benefit of the employees, like the building of a hospital for their use and the employment of agencies
for the betterment of their condition, and a general purpose and plan to benefit mankind at the
expense of others, is obvious. There should be no
confusion (of which there is evidence) of the
duties which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the
stockholders owe to the general public, and the
duties which in the law he and his codirectors owa
to protesting, minority stockholders. A business
corporation is organizeg_and carrjgq__<>_:g, :Qrimaliiy
!Ortne profit of the stockholders. The powers of
the mrecfors-are--to be employed- for t~at end.
The discretion of directors is to be -exercised in
the choice of means to attain that end, and does
not extend to a change in the end Itself, tO tlie re:,
d.uction of profits, or to the nondistribution of
profits among stockholders in order to devote them
to other purposes." (3 A.L.R. 440-1)
In making the choice of following declared law of this
St-~te which finds support through the decided cases of
many decades, or the alternative choice of following the
dictum discourse of the New Jersey Court in discarding
established law as an old and obsolete form, this Court
will, no doubt, consider Section 10 of Article XII of the
Ut~n- Q<?,nst-~ttition·--P~:escrib~g "strict interpretatio~~~ of
corporate pQ~~r~_and Section 68-3-3 _o!_ou_r_Code prescribing that ''no part of thes~~-~Yised_st_atuJ~_es i~ retroactive,
uri1.;-s e;pressly so declared'' - considerations not bed-------- -·- ------- ·--- - - - - - fore the N e:'Y~ersey Court.
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CONCLUSION
It is sub~!ted that the judgment of the District
Court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
SENIOR & SENIOR
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for
Defendants-Respondents
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